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Contemporary Military Forum I : Readiness Through 2022 and Beyond

Contemporary Military Forum I : Readiness Through 2022 and Beyond

– Good to go, all right. Good afternoon, everybody. When I taught at West Point 18 years ago, the worst class to teach was the one right after lunch, but let me tell you we’ll be okay. If I do see you nodding off
with this awesome panel, General Garrett has said that we can make you do
five pushups at least. That’ll wake you up, but it’s great to be with you, I’m Patrick Murphy. I’m one of the senior fellows at AUSA, and the former Under
Secretary of the Army, and it’s great to be with everybody here. As your professional organization, the Association for
the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare is proud to provide forums like this one throughout the whole year and including at this conference to broaden our knowledge
base of our professionals and those who support our Army. This is one of 10 AUSA ILW, Institute of Land Warfare
Professional Development Seminars conducted over then next three days. AUSA will amplify the
U.S. Army’s narrative to audiences inside the Army and to help to further
the association’s mission to be the voice of the Army,
support for the soldier. Of course, we could not do this alone. AUSA relies on its members
to help tell the Army story and to support our soldiers
and their families. A strong membership base
is vitally important for our advocacy efforts
in Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense industrial base and to the public and
communities across the country through AUSA’s 121 local chapters. If you are a AUSA member, please stand if you’re able to now, and let’s give these
members a round of applause. Thank you so very much. (audience applauding) All right, for those who are not, (mumbling) for those of you Army professionals who are not yet members of your professional association, they wanted me to give
Catholic guilt right now ’cause I was the 1987
altar boy of the year. (laughing) We’ll do this without you. No, I’m just kidding, but you’re welcome to join us, and encourage you to join AUSA by visiting the AUSA
membership booth, booth 307 in Exhibit Hall A, or sign up online at Besides serving as a senior fellow, I have the distinct honor of serving as the moderator for this forum and to turn it over to a great American and FORSCOM Commander
General Mike Garrett. General Garrett, as you know, is an Xavier RT graduate. He’s a fellow hockey dad and just a great American, and the panelists that he will moderate, I’ll go from your right to left, will be first, Lieutenant
General Chris Cavoli, who’s, like Chairman of
the Join Chiefs of Staff, I believe, a Princeton graduate. – Whoop. – I was there (mumbling). I’m 20 minutes from Princeton in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, General. Next we have a great American, and, I’m sorry, Charlie Flynn, sorry, General Flynn. Lieutenant General Charles A. Flynn. Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7. Next we have Mr. Michael Linick, Director of Personnel,
Training, and Health Program at the RAND Arroyo Center, and my former battle
buddy at the Pentagon, Lieutenant General Tom Spoehr, Lieutenant States Army retired, Director of Center for National Defense at the Heritage Foundation. Again, this is Readiness
Through 2022 and Beyond. I think it’s apropos we had Secretary McCarthy this morning, Secretary of the Army McCarthy, to talk about the last 18 years, how we’ve done combat operations, and how we’ve become proficient
in counterinsurgency, but we now need to focus
on our strategic readiness. I was just at Fort Lee two weeks ago with General Doug McBride, doing the new Army combat
physical fitness test, getting personally ready, just in case General Garrett
calls me out of the bullpen, but what they’re doing is
pretty awesome at Fort Lee and across the Army, but not just with the ACFT, but also with virtual
training and education for young men and women, so with that, please give a
very hardy round of applause for the FORSCOM Commander,
General Mike Garrett. (audience applauding) – Thanks, Mr. Secretary, and appreciate it, and a couple people have already asked if we were gonna do pushups today, and we’re not, right? And only because I don’t want
to mess up my new uniform. (laughing) This is a very timely subject, when we talk about the readiness
of the United States Army, and I’d like to thank all of you for taking time to join us, especially members of industry and our officers from our
allied and partner nations. I know every single panel member here. I know three of them very well and just had the opportunity
to meet one of them, and I will tell you from Lieutenant General
Spoehr and Michael Linick, their perspective on readiness, to the person who is responsible for readiness in our Army, right, the Army G3/5/7 Charlie Flynn there, and then one of our, and actually, and Chris
reminded me of this as we were talking earlier, not just a consumer of readiness, but maintaining readiness
of assigned forces. And so not only do you have four people who understand the Army,
understand training, but you have people who have studied all aspects of readiness, and we’re very, very
fortunate to have them here, and I’m looking forward to our discussion and particularly your
questions this afternoon, so we’re here, as I said, to talk about readiness. That’s a big deal, especially as we consider our approach to modernizing our force. In his September 27th
message to the force, the Secretary of the Army
validated the Army’s priorities, readiness, modernization, and reform. The day I assumed command of FORSCOM, my boss then, Chief of
Staff of the Army 39, looked me in the eye, and he goes, “Mike, you are responsible “for the readiness of our Army.” I mean, think about that. What if somebody said, “Hey, Tom, James, “you are responsible,
not just for first Army “in your readiness requirements, “but you are responsible for
the readiness of our Army,” and for a second there,
I’m going, holy smokes. That’s a lot, because it is, but I’ll tell you what. After a few days on the job at the United States Army Forces Command, having gained a better sense
of all of the hard work that my predecessor,
General Abrams, drove, with a whole bunch of help
from the whole Army enterprise, to put our Army in a readiness position that we hadn’t been in in decades, and so readiness is
something I think about when I wake up in the morning, and it’s something that I
think about all during the day, and shut it down right before I go to bed because absolutely nothing
keeps me awake, right? I sleep like a baby every night. I really do, but I tell you what. All day long, there are
things that I’m churning on, and one of them is readiness, and really, and unselfishly today, I am looking forward to any and all input from this group of folks here. It’s a whole bunch of smart people here, and I look forward to learning from you. The title of the panel is
Readiness Through 2022 and Beyond, and as that title implies, readiness will remain a
critical endeavor for our Army, but our approach to it
can and should evolve. You hear our chief of
staff, General McConville, talk about pulling our Army out of the Industrial Age into the 21st century, into the Information Age, and guess what? We are assessing and
evaluating readiness today, eerily similar to the way we were doing it when I came in the Army 35 years ago, and guess what? I think we can do better. There has to be, if not a better, certainly a more modern approach. You’ve heard a lot of people
talk about the complexity of the time in history we find ourselves, and we’re at that
ubiquitous inflection point that already you all hear about. Here’s what I will tell you after seven months in this job. Our Army is ready to fight today. Our Army is ready to fight and win today, but the challenge is, how do we maintain sufficient
amount of readiness to beat our national defense
strategy requirements? But more importantly, how do we, as we look to provide credible and capable strategic land power for large scale ground combat operations, how do we prevent conflict,
shape the environment, and win decisively in the current fight? And then the bigger question is, how do we ensure that we are ready for the future fight? And to do that, and this is something that
I believe with all my heart, to do that, we have got to modernize our force, or our Army risks irrelevance. Our Army risks irrelevance if we don’t get serious and
execute the plan that we’re on. The focus on long range, precision fires, next generation combat
vehicles, future vertical lift, Army network, air missile
defense, and soldier lethality will go a long ways towards insuring we maintain
our competitive edge. This week you’re gonna hear
a lot about modernization, but there is a lot more
to it than new equipment. The fact is, modernization is
readiness, future readiness. This week you’ll hear
Chief of Staff of the Army talk about strategic readiness, the ability to mobilize,
deploy, and sustain our forces. FORSCOM’s focus is on tactical readiness, and that is that we man,
train, equip our forces so that they can quickly
mobilize, deploy, fight, and win. While we build and sustain readiness, we have to consider impacts
to the Army total force when it comes to modernization. Under sustainable readiness, any unit, regardless of level of modernization, can and should be prepared to deploy, and that means that our
least modern formations must be interoperable with
our most modern formations. We’re working with all
of the Army commands to ensure our efforts to modernize are synchronized throughout the Army while sustaining readiness, and this may require
interim shifts and emphasis between readiness and modernization. There is a discussion right now as we look at the Army’s campaign plan, and some of you have asked this question. What does it mean to shift from
readiness to modernization? Well, I just laid out for you the Secretary of the Army’s priorities, and the first one was readiness, but we are gonna have to nuance our way through our modernization efforts, and there may be days in
the future where we wake up and the priority for that day may be modernization vice readiness, and we need to be agile enough to do that. So we’re never, ever, ever
gonna back off of readiness, and we’re always gonna be ready to meet our nation’s requirements, but we do need to ensure that
our modernization efforts are synchronized and
nested with our ability to sustain tactical readiness, and maintain our ability to
quickly deploy, fight, and win. So, again, before I past the microphone over to our panel members, I’d like to once again thank each of you for taking time out of your day to be here with you, and I’m looking forward to
having a great discussion. Thank you all very, very much. (audience applauding) – Well, thanks, General Garrett, and thank you for the
opportunity to be on this panel with these distinguished panelists who I have great respect for. This is a super important discussion. From my position, outside the Army, I have watched with admiration as the Army has essentially climbed out of a readiness ditch, if you will, to improve the readiness of its BCTs. Starting around 2015, to the point where in March of this year, General Milley reported that
over half of the Army’s BCTs have reached the top levels of readiness. It’s a huge improvement, and as we report in this document, which I’m shamelessly promoting, the Heritage Index of
U.S. Military Strength, available in both booth 78, 68, this is a real reflection, and there aren’t many honestly, of the increased funding
that this administration has put against defense
in the last two years. It is also reflective
of the huge importance and the emphasis that Army leaders have put on readiness since 2015. It’s captured best by
General Milley when he says, and if you haven’t heard this 100 times, then you’re not in the Army, “Readiness is the number one priority, “and there is no other number one.” The Army should be very
proud of this achievement and where they’ve gotten to today. Having said that, I will offer that I believe the word readiness is one of the most overused and least understood words in the Army and probably in the entire U.S. military. It can be and is used for justification for any number of programs from tank ammunition to swimming pools, and when people say readiness, that’s not enough. You got to ask them what
do they really mean. You can never be completely
sure what they’re talking about. When you go to a meeting about readiness, you don’t know what to prepare for because there are so many
different varieties of readiness, and so we have invented
essentially a number of different modifiers to discuss what the heck we’re talking about. So as General Garrett mentioned, you’ll hear the words tactical readiness. You’ll also hear individual readiness. You’ll hear unit readiness to talk about the hard readiness of our units and soldiers, and these types of measures of readiness are typically graded
against solid metrics, like equipment on hand,
tasks trained to standard, or personnel availability. As we have seen, this type of readiness responds very well to increased money, increased attention, and increased time. In a book that I’ll
refer to several times, “Military Readiness,” by a
guy named Dr. Richard Betts, which I recommend this
book if you’ve not seen it. He refers to this type of readiness as operational readiness, and this is that area in which the Army has
made dramatic progress. You’ll also hear the word, and I think General
Garrett just mentioned it, future readiness, and leaders use this word to justify the importance of investment in the Army modernization, and they’re not wrong, but they are trying to get on the readiness
bandwagon essentially. And you can have formations with all the required equipment that’s well maintained,
all the people you need, and they can be slaughtered by an opponent that has more modern equipment, and so I think probably the
Polish horse calvary units at the start a World War Two were probably impeccably
maintained and manned and had all the horses
they were supposed to have, and German armor units slaughtered them. In July of 2014, the Army
published Army Regulation 525-30, titled Strategic Readiness in an effort to capture a
broader aspect of readiness, and the Army defines strategic readiness as the readiness of the
Army, as an institution, to provide sufficient, capable units to support the national military strategy. Strategic readiness seeks to
evaluate areas not considered in operational readiness, such as the generating
force, the capacity, or the size of the Army
versus the anticipated needs, installations and mobilization platforms, war reserve stocks, and the
ability to deploy Army forces. Professor Betts, who wrote that book, also recognizes this need for a more holistic type
of readiness definition. He calls it structural readiness, but they’re really both getting
at the same kind of thing. Betts talks about structural readiness as how soon a force of the size necessary to deal with the enemy can be available. Whatever you call it, structural readiness, strategic readiness, these are much more difficult questions, a more wicked problem, than measuring operational readiness, but at least as important. Questions of strategic
readiness would include, how large an army do we need, of what type units,
how quickly deployable, and with what stocks of
ammunition and spare parts, and how quickly do we need
to mobilize those parts of the Army that are not ready? Recalling my days on the Army staff, we had a very difficult time coming up with any sort of definite requirement for the number and type of units that would be required to mobilize. I remember we were talking
about World War two barracks. I think it was at Fort
Stewart at the time, and we knew that they had
proven useful in the past to mobilize Army units
that were coming in, but we had no idea how much
barracks capacity we needed, so could we destroy these old barracks and save the maintenance cost, or did we need to keep them for some sort of eventuality? We just had no way of knowing at the time. Considerations of strategic readiness will also cause questions to be asked about whether it’s preferable to have a larger army with a lower level of readiness, or a smaller army with a very high level of readiness. Well, the normal response, at
least when I was in the Army, is we want as much readiness
as we can get, don’t we? But that may not be the right answer. A strategic readiness system would cause you to ask
whether it makes sense to maintain the number of BCTs in a high state of readiness, even if TRANSCOM, Transportation Command, can’t get them anywhere in any reasonable amount of time, and so you may have a ton of ready BCTs and no way to get them across the ocean, and you would ask yourselves, “Does that make sense?” Or would you be better
off taking that money, and the time spent to
maintain these units, and apply it to another Army priority, like modernization or installations? I remember when I was working in Army G8 and overseeing the programming
for missile launchers. I think it was Patriot, but it could’ve been something else, and I realized there was no real benefit, at least in the readiness system, to buying missiles. You get a benefit for buying the launcher, but there was nowhere in
our Army readiness system where we tracked how many
missiles did we have on hand, and so I remember vividly,
frankly, General Chiarelli getting all upset when he found out we had bought a bunch of, were planning to buy a bunch of launchers and just one or two missiles, and we would count on OCO funds to buy the missiles that we needed. He didn’t think that was a
wise strategy for some reason. A strategic readiness system would’ve highlighted
that kind of a problem. There are typically hidden and
under-discussed consequences for an army to maintain a
level of tactical readiness higher than what is needed. In a world of finite resources, every dollar spent maintaining a unit in a high level of readiness
above what is needed to execute the national defense strategy is a dollar that could be
spent modernizing the force, fixing an installation,
recruiting or retaining a soldier, or sending a soldier to school. To maintain a high level of readiness not needed by the strategy can stress soldiers and
puts miles on Army vehicles and hours on Army aircraft, more quickly taking them to
the end of their life cycles, so how do we get this right? Professor Betts suggests that three questions must be answered. The first is, determine
the readiness for when. How quickly are ready units
needed for the strategy? You need to understand whether, how, and when an adversary will go to war, and this answers the question, at what timeframe do Army
forces need to be ready? The second question
is, readiness for what? What type of war do we anticipate? What type of adversary
should we prepare to fight? Under what conditions? Answers the question, what and how much Army
capability is needed? My research, again,
available at our booth, suggests that the regular Army is too small for the near-peer strategy that’s contemplated in our
national defense strategy, and then finally the third question is, readiness of what? What forces should be made ready first? How should they be sequenced? And this helps answer the question of priorities and resources. General Garrett alluded to this, but the current published
Army strategy reflects that the Army is focusing on
readiness now through 2022, and then the Army will priority, will shift to modernization as a new generation starts
to arrive in the force. It may be instead that
readiness in all of its forms, future, strategic, operational, needs to operate in
parallel with modernization versus a shift in priority. That type of sequential thinking has gotten us into
trouble with both cases, with modernization, when we
take modernization holidays, and also when we have readiness holidays. I also believe we need to do a better job with our terminology,
establish firm definitions, train our officers and
non-commission officers how to think about readiness
in a more sophisticated way, and as we focus on near-peer competition, we’re gonna have to have better terms and better systems to manage
the risk and the force. I’ll close my remarks by
congratulating the Army on the vastly increased levels of tactical readiness they have achieved and looking forward to the
future successes of the Army. Thank you. – Thanks. Thank you, sir, (audience applauding) so good afternoon, and thanks to all of you for attending. Thanks to AUSA and ILW
for hosting the panel, to General Garrett for
inviting me to speak, and to my fellow panel members
for their thoughts today, and for their careers’ worth
of contributions and service. From General Spoehr you
heard today about readiness from a variety of perspectives and his thoughts on Richard
Betts’s three questions of, readiness for what, readiness for when, and readiness with what? And as was often the case in my career, having worked for him several times, General Spoehr shaped a
profoundly important discussion, about which I get the opportunity to provide additional context and depth. He talked a lot about
what we need to measure, and I specifically want talk more about how we measure readiness. Without understanding what we can or do measure about readiness, and what we can’t or don’t
measure about readiness, we’re challenged to know if we have enough or if we have it in the right ways. Over the course of my
various research projects involving the measurement of readiness, I’ve come to believe that we must do so at four distinctly levels of analysis, which in many ways track
with the distinctions both General Spoehr and
Richard Betts have highlighted. I would suggest that at each level, we must have a different
way of measuring readiness. The levels will interrelate, and we need to understand those relationships and dependencies, but each is still a fundamentally
different measurement. At the highest level, the strategic level, we want to know whether or not the force, as it is today, and as we’ve
programmed it for tomorrow, can execute the demands of
the national defense strategy, the defense of planning guidance, or whatever the document du jour is for establishing the guidance for what the joint force
must be prepared to execute. These types of measurements are characterized by
tremendous uncertainty. Who will we fight, when,
and for what goals? As Chairman, General Dempsey
was famous for noting that we have a 100% wrong record of predicting these fights. In some cases, we’ve got the
technology and doctrine right, but we got the foe wrong, as when we went to war with Iraq in 1991. In some cases we have the wrong focus, technologically and doctrinally, as when we began the hard process of relearning stability operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Department of
Defense’s analytic agenda or support to strategic analysis processes are supposed to help with
these types of measurements, and in some ways they do. However, they have
significant shortfalls too. The SSA process, with its
integrated security construct, numbered scenarios,
and a set of vignettes, does provide some measure
of breadth and analysis, a breadth that is designed to make sure we are looking at a
range of possible futures and not betting everything on a single future coming to pass. Similarly the campaign
analysis done at COCOMs and in the joint staff provide additional touch points for understanding how or how well the current
or programmed force will perform against a range of threats. However, I firmly believe that the outcome of much of this analysis is precisely wrong answers, which do little to help
senior decision makers understand risk, resource
trades, or readiness. In large part, I believe
it is because the modeling is so overdetermined that it can’t serve as an effective learning
or investigative tool, nor can it provide meaningful options for the department to choose from. Methods for robust decision making, or decision making under
uncertainty are available, and I believe should be used more often. These methodologies expand
the portfolio analysis of the SSA many fold and provide a much more robust picture of the range of potential demands that could be placed on the joint force. This in turn provides
a much richer data set to inform the question
of, readiness with what? The second level of analysis for readiness is at the operational level. This is the level of the defense
readiness reporting system, or DRRS, was meant to help illuminate. In DRRS, each COCOM assessed their ability to meet a range of O-plans and COM-plans, and DRRS represents a great leap forward in readiness analysis, but it too has much room for improvement. Unit reporting in DRRS is based on the sets of (mumbling) tasks that provide little information
about the conditions under which those tasks were trained. Thus, for example, an Air
Force squadron in DRRS might show itself as trained
in providing close air support, but it won’t be clear to the
COCOM whether that training reflects the operational realities of CAS in Afghanistan or the operational
realities of providing CAS through a Russian-integrated
air defense system. The unit is ready, but ready for what? And given the Army decision to
have standardized (mumbling), the breadth of tasks available to COCOMs can be constrained. In this area, we have to ask ourselves, do we have the right distribution of (mumbling) tasks
trained across the force, whereas I discussed with
General Cavoli earlier today, are we training the (mumbling) under the right
distribution of conditions, and how much risk is there in having the distribution wrong? But the right distribution
must be a time, risk, and resource-based discussion. How much time and which
resources do I need to shift that distribution to meet the unexpected or
the non-prioritized event? Second, units don’t operate by themselves, and the unit-based system from which DRRS information is drawn does not necessarily indicate
whether or not the unit is trained to operate
in a task organization under which it will be expected to fight. We tend to be well practiced at operating with U.S. Army task organizations. For our priority fights, however, it will be imperative that we can operate within joint and multi-national
task organizations, at a variety of levels, and with a variety of command and support relationships. Our ability to do so is poorly measured and poorly understood. Finally, at the operational level, regional COCOMs are completely
dependent on the ability of the functional COCOMs, most immediately TRANSCOM, but also SOCOM, STRATCOM, and increasingly now, CYBERCOM. Equally important are the
contributions of defense agencies, like the defense logistics and
the defense health agencies. We may be able to give these commands and agencies effective guidance on what to be ready for,
with what, and when, but until we have better metrics of their readiness to do so, and of the risks involved
at each readiness level, we don’t really know how ready we are. This talks to General Spoehr’s comments about buying the launchers, but not the missiles. Are you ready? The third level of analysis is the one with which most
of us are most familiar, unit level readiness. This is a measurement of
whether a unit is trained and resourced to conduct
a set of (mumbling) tasks or, if already assigned
a specific mission, to execute those mission-directed tasks. In this area, the Army has been making
some very good progress towards improving the
measurement of readiness. Over the last several years, the Army’s introduced Objective T to better measure training outcomes. It has started to develop
metrics in a tracking system for measuring interoperability. It has started to look at how you measure outcomes and tasks, like building partner capacity. Each of these will better inform the Army as to how to build and
measure readiness in units, and where the resource
strateging is working and where it isn’t. The biggest challenge, however,
with unit level readiness is at the scene between the
unit and the operational levels. As I mentioned above, the distribution of units, by task, but also by readiness levels, should be a deliberate set of choices informed by time and resource requirements and by risk tolerance. Readiness is characterized by entropy. Left alone, it will decay. The Army has long understood this and has always had some
version of cyclic readiness and some version of tiered readiness. The names and program elements change, but the Army isn’t, nor
should it strive to be, capable of keeping the entire force at a high level of readiness at all times. In fact, it is important to keep in mind that the Army has always chosen, even during the height
of the surge in Iraq, to be over-structured. What this means is that the Army has always shown a preference for accepting an Army that
can’t possibly be ready across all of the dimensions and instead relies on moving resources to build readiness as needed. Whether you call it an (mumbling) Army or tiered readiness or ARFORGEN or SRM, this prevalence for over-structure
is baked into our DNA, and at some point, we
need to do a better job of embracing it and managing it rather than lamenting it. What is missing then from
unit readiness measurement is a clear set of guide posts on what is the necessary distribution to mitigate risk or
respond to COCOM needs. The guide posts should be
informed first and foremost by COCOM demands and campaign timelines, but also by training levels
and their rates of change of mobilization capacity
and its elasticity, transportation capacity
and its elasticity, and by risk guidance and hedging options. Today’s sustainable readiness model is a good first approximation of this, and truth be told, a careful and detailed
measurement may not be feasible. Still further grounding SRM
goals and unit readiness funding in solid analytics that include
these factors is important. The final level of analysis is
in many ways the hardest one and the easiest one. For units to build readiness, we know that they need people with the right mix of
skills and experience, equipment as dictated
by both their (mumbling) and by mission-specific demands when known or knowable, and that the equipment must work, which implies a certain
availability of spare parts, but at the highest level, these three deliverables, people, equipment, and parts, rely on systems that stretch
far beyond the unit itself. I won’t go into a lot of
detail about those systems, except to say that we need
better ways of tracking how they or where they
incorporate unit level resourcing as their ultimate output metric. As for unit level resourcing, it is possible that at one point, we understood why we set
readiness reporting standards for these resources the way we did. Was there science behind the decision at the breakpoint between
level one and level two? Is the difference between 90%
or more personnel available and not 89% or 92%? In every resource area, we have these break points that enable us to take what is essentially a continuous function, where more is always better, and report it as a step function, where only four thresholds matter, and a lot of movement can happen, and a lot of resources can be expended without ever having the
unit or resource area cross to the next threshold. I’m not sure that there’s an effective way to report readiness as
the continuous function that it really is, and I’m not sure that we understand why we chose the thresholds we chose, and I’m not sure that we understand, at more than an intuitive level, how different levels
for equipment on hand, equipment readiness, personnel,
and training really interact to create an overall C-level
or unit readiness level. I suspect we could do a
better job of doing so. I’m not yet convinced that
doing a better job is necessary as long as we understand the limits of what our commander’s
USR is really telling us. I’m not sure if you’ll
take my thoughts today as a good news story
or as a bad news story. I don’t really believe it’s either. The DOD and the Army continuously have been improving the ways
in which they measure readiness across all four levels I’ve discussed. Researchers, like General
Spoehr and myself, and policymakers, like Generals Garrett, and Cavoli, and Flynn, will always want to
find ways to do better. If I had to summarize my advice to them and to the Army and DOD
as succinctly as possible, I would offer these few thoughts. First, readiness will always
be a function of time, so in everything you measure, make sure you understand
how time affects it. Ready enough today may be good enough for next week’s demand, but not for tomorrow’s. Find ways to incorporate rates of change into readiness reporting. Second, this impact of time means that the most readiness
resourcing decisions are about distributions of
readiness to be achieved. Be clear about what the distribution is that’s necessary to allow
time, given your resources to produce the readiness required. Third, readiness is a continuous function, not a step function, so use the C-level reporting
as a first step in analysis, not as the last step, and finally risk is the
inverse of readiness. Readiness must always be
considered with risk, guidance, and tolerances in mind. More is good, but it’s
not always necessary, and resources, say, from
current unit readiness may be what are needed to
effect the mobilization, transportation, leader development, and modernization demands of the Army. The challenge is to trust
your yardstick enough to know when you’ve gotten where you need to go. Thanks again to ILW, to
AUSA, to General Garrett, and to my fellow panel members. It’s been a great honor. Thank you. (audience applauding) – General Garrett, thanks
for having us here today, and to Tom and Mike, I
appreciate the comments made. Two things that I’ll start with, first of all, two good things, one, everything that Tom
and Mike just described, we are working on helping
us measure all the things that Mike and Tom discussed here about measuring readiness, and I’ll get into that in a little bit. The second thing is, we do know where the missiles are, and we have them, and there’s plenty of them, so we fixed that to date. Believe me. I spend a lot of time
on missiles every day, so I think the fundamental challenge that we’re faced with
as kind of outlined here is that maintaining the
readiness that we’ve gained and the readiness initiatives while at the same time
modernizing the force, bringing new capabilities
into new formations and having to balance that with potentially flat resources, so I’ll come back to that at the end because I think that’s
the fundamental challenge that we’re face with today. A lot of discussion here this morning, and I don’t have to tell this group, but the Army in the last two decades have been laser focused and in the last really I
would say five to seven years on building unit readiness, and some of those discussions
were pointed out here, but they were done in the context of no clear peer adversary, an enormous demand on the force over the last two decades specifically, and that demand continues today. There were tactical challenges
that were confronted and could be confronted by
the brigade combat teams. I don’t want anyone to forget that. That was really between
about 2006 and 2009, was when we ended up
converting all the brigades from the Army of excellence to the Army up to the module of force, so we haven’t really been doing it for just over a decade or so, and then arguably we’ve
had a singular focus in the Middle East. Okay, break. From that, really in the last 18 months, we have for the first
time in quite a while a coherent and consistent
set of strategic documents, the national security strategy, the national military strategy, the defense planning guidance, the Army strategy, and the Army vision, and we’re in the throes of making the Army
campaign plan great again to make sure that we have some rigor in how we actually see ourselves. And so in those documents, they’re really describing what at least the next decade
and beyond look like with great power competition, global simultaneity, the
ability to generate forces through the global operating model into priority regions using dynamic force employment, trying to be strategically predictable to our allies and partners while being tactically unpredictable to what our adversaries see. And then of course our
concept in the Army, because we see that we have
some gaps through analysis in large scale combat operations, and the way we’re gonna fix that is addressing some of those gaps, and that gap analysis feeds
into our operational concept of multi-domain operations. Again, the Army has made enormous gains at the brigade level, and even here and throughout the crowd, a lot of discussion is at the brigade combat team level, and there’s no doubt that the Army in the last really five
years has increased nearly 50% better ratings by
those brigade combat teams, but the Army is more than
brigade combat teams. The Army needs those functional and multi-functional brigades, and they need to see two headquarters to be able to control those functions once they’re employed, and those enabling capabilities largely are the things
that the joint force needs, and they need them all the time, as is needed today. So that brings me to strategic readiness, so we are doing some work re-looking at, as mentioned earlier by Tom Spoehr, Army Regulation 525-30, which is about strategic readiness. We have really good models on C one, C two, C three,
C four for unit readiness. We need to dig in a little bit on force projection readiness, and those two gears, really additive, create strategic readiness, and we need to look at this because the demand is
not going to decrease. I mean, we have nearly
175,000 U.S. Army soldiers deployed in about 140 countries today. That demand’s not coming down, at least for the foreseeable
future that I see, so we’re gonna have to balance what we have achieved in readiness and at the same time, try to take the appropriate resources, matched up against the priorities that the Army senior
leaders have laid out, and try to develop and introduce and provide increased capabilities to increase lethality to the formations and do that in a timely
manner beginning now. The global operating model and dynamic force employment that I mentioned earlier, this is a new way that the joint force is going to both measure our readiness, put demands on the force, and then use that readiness so we can provide it to
commanders like General Cavoli and other GCC or other
theater Army commanders that need to put those
forces into their theaters in the contact layer so they can compete
against their adversaries. We’re gonna need to do this, because we recognize that having access and having presence and having influence with our allies and partners out there is enormously important. We’re not gonna do this alone. We have to do it with those relationships that we’re building across the globe. We have to maintain those relationships by having those formations forward in the contact layer operating every day so we can increase our interoperability and really build the
readiness that we need at the tactical level to solve operational
and strategic problems. The Defender Series that we have coming up is an example of that, and we’re gonna do this every year. This year is wading into Europe, and Chris Cavoli here is
gonna take an enormous amount of formations right out of
the continental United States, integrate them will his allies through the NATO relationships, and then integrate them with the forces that he has assigned on
the continent of Europe. We’re gonna do it four months later out to the Pacific, not quite as big into Europe, but the plan is to use
this Defender Series to bring joint capabilities together, the bulk of that being Army
land component capabilities, so we can exercise all these
strategic readiness challenges that we’re confronted with. Mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and then redeployment, those things have to happen, those RSO and I tasks that have to happen. In many ways, what we’ve been
doing for a number of years is going from the known to the known, and what we need to begin to operate and begin to test ourselves
and stress ourselves is going from the unknown to the unknown, and that’s where this Defenders Series, through (mumbling) and
dynamic force employment, is gonna begin to test
some of these systems that need to get stressed, and they need to be measured so that we get an idea of
how we actually see ourselves by way of strategic readiness. The last thing I’d say is there’s a number of
training initiatives that are going on at the lower level. I think most of you understand we’ve extended some of the basic training for a number of our MOSs. We have built new formations already. We have I2Qs. The secretary talked
about it this morning. We’re building multi-domain task force. We have SFABs that are being built. There’s an SFAC over the top of that, a recognition that we’re not walking away from the things that we’ve learned in the last two decades, and then of course all the 31 programs and the six priorities
that Army Futures Command is working on from the
synthetic training environment to hypersonics to everything in between, so getting the force to the point where it can receive
those new capabilities and maintain its readiness is paramount for the Army senior leaders. And again, I’ll just close on the fundamental
challenge we’re faced with is maintaining this readiness and the initiatives associated with this, while modernizing the force and doing it with a leveled off level of resources, so I look forward to your questions. I’m thankful for the thoughts that both Tom and Mike offered here. I’m sure Chris has some
things that commanders make the G3 think about all the time, but we’re looking forward
to your questions too. Thanks very much for your time. (audience applauding) – Sir, sir, so the amazing thing about following panelists
as qualified as Tom and Mike and Charlie is they have literally said everything I was going to say, (laughing) but that will not stop me. They did cause me to
think of other things. Charlie talked about going from the unknown to the unknown, which is a very succinct description of the land navigation course at Ranger School for
Lieutenant Cavoli in 1988, so let’s try to do better than that although they let me
get through eventually. So all of this comes together sort of at the theater Army level, so we employ the force, for the most part, in theaters run by geographic
combatant commanders, and in each of those, we have an Army headquarters, and that’s my job in Europe, and as such, I own both
sides of the equation. We have an assigned force, and we have a theater set, and I’m required to keep those ready, so as General Garrett
pointed out a minute ago, (mumbling) is a provider. Any theater Army is a
provider of readiness, but is also ultimately
the consumer of readiness. We’re both a force generator and a force employer. This means we have to both
keep people ready to fight, but we also have to keep our force ready to receive strategic level reinforcements, and so this is really
what defines our activity in U.S. Army, Europe, and I’d like to speak just for a moment, because honestly most of the great points I thought I had have
already been said better and more eloquently by my colleagues here. However, this idea of
echelons of readiness is absolutely critical from
a theater Army perspective. It is not good enough for me to try to go to sleep at night knowing that we have ready brigades. They have to be ready
brigades that are employable and a ready operational construct with ready strategic
backbone to reinforce them, and so we are concerned
in any theater Army with all three echelons of readiness and pretty much from my
perspective as the commander in reverse order, strategic readiness, and then operational readiness, and then tactical readiness. So strategic readiness consists of the set of the theater, its preparation, its understanding, and its ability to receive a reinforcement and employ it. Secondly, at the operational echelon, the ability to command
and control large scale ground combat operations and to sustain them over time in a sustained land campaign as part of a joint fight, that sounds like something out of our textbooks, but that is an amazing thing
when you contemplate it as compared to the way
we had been operating. So I very much applaud the focus that the Army has been
putting on operational and strategic level readiness in the last couple of years. At the tactical level, at the tactical level, theater readiness really focuses on the conditions. I was speaking with Mike
about this a little earlier, but it’s the conditions almost as much as the tasks that drive our understanding of whether a unit is ready. For instance, the conditions in Europe involve terrain and vegetation and weather that is specific to the operational area. I see my colleagues here, the Land Forces Chief General
(mumbling) from Latvia, (speaking in a foreign language) the Land Forces Chief from Lithuania. I thought Petri (speaking
in a foreign language) back there from Finland. Believe me. Their countries do not look like the National Training Center. (laughing) The terrain and the vegetation and the weather are not the same, so there is a certain specificity that we have to achieve really to be ready at the tactical level, and then at all three echelons, we really have to be careful to do what two of my
colleagues talked about, which is to operate with our allies. It is not good enough to be an excellent force that has to operate in isolation. We have to be an excellent force that can operate in other places with those forces. In some cases, they’re allies. In some cases, they’re close friends. In some cases, they’re temporary partners, but in any event, our ability to incorporate those forces and to complement their operations is fundamental to our
prospects for success, and as Mike pointed out, this is something that we have struggled over the years to measure, and this level of interoperability is something that we have
to work on every day. Finally, as Charlie pointed
out a couple of minutes ago, we have the Defender Series. Most of the things I just talked about are physical realities, the realities of the terrain, the realities of the
time, distance factors, the realities of putting brigade after brigade through a single port, the realities of the concrete composition of railheads in Eastern Europe. These are physical realities. The only way we can really find where we are not ready in terms of these physical realities is by doing, is by doing, and in this regard, the U.S. Army is leading the way with the Defender Series of exercises which will practice strategic, operational, and tactical
readiness simultaneously at scale across global distances, so with that, I’ll pause, and I look forward to the discussion. (audience applauding) – Gentlemen, thank you for your comments. General Spoehr, I think you were right on the term readiness. We just had about a 30 minute conversation on the multiple facets of readiness, so ladies and gentlemen,
I’ll play the traffic cop. I’m Colonel Chris Black from FORSCOM on the Q and A session. As you can see right
there in the audience, you have four different microphones, so we ask that you go ahead and come on up to the microphones, and I’ll sequence you in to have a more robust
conversation on readiness with the esteemed panel members. I ask that we only ask one
question at a time if possible. I know sometimes that’s hard, and then just please
state kind of who you are, where you’re from, and you who you work for, so with that, ma’am, go to you. – [Woman] Okay, I’m (speaking
in a foreign language). I’m running the Association
of the U.S. Army overseas chapter in Kuwait. My profession, I’m an
expert in (mumbling) making, my qualification, and I
do some volunteer work for cancer patients, so that’s the three things. (laughing) My question would be, as interesting as my background, so the first part is you cannot manage what you cannot measure, but at the same time, we recognize that past is singular and the future is by definition assured to be multiple, so what would be the question? Back to the panel, what would be the gap
between your research and development in measuring readiness and the reality? If we have multiple futures, which distribution would you take? In the financial world, they say that it is black swan, and they’re black elephant in how catastrophic events could happen, so how you make sense of that? And very quickly, I’m a very big fan and advocate
of social infrastructure, so you have systems and everything, but what do you do for
the soldiers, for them, managing their time? I think managing their
energy is more important than managing their time to have more productivity, and that’s related to health, so thank you. – Managing their energy, that is a wonderful euphemism, excellent. (laughing) – I’ll jump in just real quickly, first by saying I did talk a little bit about these concepts of decision
making under uncertainty or robust decision making, which are sort of
portfolio based approaches, and the trick for that is that you have to be able to build up a large enough portfolio to really understand
where the trade space is. But the concept behind it is that you’re willing to sub-optimize against a particular outcome as a hedge against possible outcomes, which is very different than the way we used to
do threat based planning, which is, if I’m ready for the Soviets, everything else is lesser included. I’ve made that decision. I’ll be ready for them, and if anything else comes up, my assumption going in, which I can validate with
some amount of testing, is that I’d be ready for that other threat at some acceptable level of risk, maybe not optimized for it. We’re coming back into
that sort of a system with some of the priorities
that we’ve been given within our defense strategic guidance about how, against what threats, we want to measure,
what types of readiness, so the trick is to understand, A, are we ready for
the directed scenarios, and then, B, what might
readiness there cost us against the unexpected, and do we want to hedge or not? And that’s where this expanded
portfolio analysis comes in, but that’s at the strategic level. I’m gonna sort of lay off on
the other levels for right now and let my colleague speak. – I would just say we used to talk about most
dangerous course of action or the most likely course of action. I think we should run these scenarios against a hybrid of those kinds of things. What’s most dangerous for the Army? Obviously we want to be able to be prepared against that, but we cannot, as Mike
has kind of alluded to, ignore the most likely, which is probably not near-peer, large scale conventional
ground operations, so we need to be thinking
about that as well, and so I talk about in some
of the research I’ve done how this is a much more complex area. We have never, since maybe 1935 or so, had to prepare for two near-peers. We’ve always had the
luxury to think about one, and now we’re in this area where we’re having to think about two. It’s hard to prepare concepts. It’s hard to think about O-plans when you have two near-peer threats, but that’s just where the
Army’s gonna have to go, and I make no illusion that it’s gonna be easy. – To build off what Tom said, it’s even within a given theater, it’s not easy now, and it’s important not
to reach back too much to the past for models. In many ways, the Cold War was a very, very easy construct for us. We had, for the U.S. Army, there was a requirement to defend in one country against a known enemy force at a known location at an unknown time. Now those are all unknowns, unknown contingency, unknown force, unknown time, unknown location, and frankly unknown area of operation within the larger European theater, so it’s very important to try to measure what we do know but understand what we don’t know about what we’re trying to get done. – I would just say so we’ve been told to do what I call four Ds, defeat, deter, disrupt, and defend, so we know that, and I think there’s some
pretty good war games that are going on in the future. Take into account many of the things that Chris just talked about, and then I think there’s some
really good work going on by the combatant commanders on their plans. So I think there’s some intellectual rigor that’s happening where there’s
less clarity in the future, but at least there’s some
scenario driven war games that are giving us some idea of what things might be, and then there are the knowns of, hey, we have to have X force at Y location with Z capabilities to
do the following things, and I think the real PhD level work here is kind of matching those two to make sure that we’re
looking at the right things. In some ways, seeing ourselves is more important than seeing the adversary. Knowing what we have, what we don’t have, where it is, how quickly it can get there, or how slowly, how much
lift it needs to do that, is more important than necessarily knowing exactly where
the enemy’s formation is at exact times. – [Chris] And, of course,
talking about complexity, sir, we also added more domains in the last few years
that add to it, so, sir. – [Dave] Hi, Dave (mumbling). I’m with National Guard Bureau J55. I’m a contractor. I don’t speak for NGB, but I’m a retired Army, so I’ve had 30 years of experience there and 14 more as a contractor in strategic planning
and domestic planning. My question is really to any
one of the panel members, anyone who wants to answer this, but you talked about the
global operating model, dynamic force employment. I assume that leads into the
global integrated exercises. You talked about EDREs and DFEs, working on that, and the allies and partners could be incorporated
into all of those things, but my question is more
about simultaneity. You talked about the Defender Series being Europe, then Pacific. Someone once said, “There are no priorities
amongst essentials.” What is the Army thinking, in an unclassified way,
about homeland defense? Because of the global operating model, we need to remember that the homeland is not a sanctuary anymore, so what does the Army see from the perspective of, no, we don’t necessarily have
a vision of land forces, but what about the Army’s missile defense or its base, cyber, whatever else? – I’ll take a stab, so defend the homeland is arguably the most
important mission we have of those four Ds. Obviously there are threats that we’re gonna have to confront outside of the United States, but I think when I made the comment about going from the
unknown to the unknown, that unknown is brought to us by adversaries that are gonna disrupt our ability to actually move, and so terminals, ports, air fields, railheads, sea terminals, those things are all on
the commercial market. They’re all run by some form, either private or public partnership, but we are gonna have to rely on those to be able to project force, so we have to work with local, state, and
federal level officials to make sure that we’ve got some synergy and some coordination between all the layers that are gonna participate in the homeland defense mission. So to your question, we take it very seriously, and part of being able
to project the forces into the Pacific and Europe is to actually exercise some of those things
going on in the homeland so that we can, again, see ourselves and our ability to project that power. And the best feedback we’re gonna get is from units, commanders
at the local level, and using terminals and ports that we’re gonna share
with our local communities and work together to make sure that we overcome some of those obstacles that we know are gonna confront us. Cyber is an easy one. That will happen. – [Hallock] Good morning, gentlemen. Colonel Hallock, I’m with the Military
Intelligence Readiness Command at Fort Belvoir. Can you speak to readiness in the Reserves and how we’re planning? You speak of a million person Army, but a lot of it’s made up
of Reserves and the Guard, and we don’t participate every day, but we have like the civil affairs. Most of that’s in our backyard. How do you plan on
readiness for the Reserves, if you could speak to that, gentlemen? Thanks. (mumbling) – That’s a great question, and I asked Charlie if
I could answer it first because in my tactical,
operational, strategic construct, because I wasn’t wearing these awesome looking glasses, I neglected to talk
about all three compos, so Chip Luckey’s back
there waving his hand. Mike Harvey, stand up for a sec there. (mumbling) (laughing) Mike Harvey commands our
Reserve Command in Europe. Joe Gerrard’s back there. Major General Gerrard’s our
Deputy Commanding General for Army National Guard. Everything I talked about at the tactical level and at the operational level and at the strategic level requires all three compos for our operations inside Europe, and therefore readiness at all three of those echelons indeed
becomes a strategic thing in and of itself when we talk
about strategic readiness, so we try to exercise it a lot. Defender ’20 will certainly
exercise it at scale, and with that, I’ll pause and turn it over to Charlie. – Yeah, I think a couple of things. First of all, we’ve got to recognize the cyclic nature by which the Guard and the Reserve have to
be able to participate, but candidly I think
getting these exercises on a calendar so that
there’s some predictability in the capability to be generated. And as you pointed out, rightfully so, there’s a number of enabling capabilities that are very early on needed in the war plan in any theater, so part of the idea
with the Defender Series is to look for those capabilities that are going to be early deployers, time it so that your cycle enables you or allows you to participate in it, and then go over and do those things that Chris was describing where you’re actually exercising like how we actually do this. And so we’re gonna need
your feedback back well in both compo two and three to say what’s the best fit for that, and coming back, in fact, I see Tom James
sitting here up front, to the previous question, there’s a whole nother host of things that are gonna happen in the homeland with the Guard and Reserve that are going to be
complementary to what we’re doing, but it’s also gonna be challenging to what we’re doing, so I actually think that, again, back to seeing ourselves
through this process. I think that’s gonna be
the most important thing that we gain from it. – I’ll just add. A critical part, I mean, if you’ve ever bought insurance, you get this pitch about
whole life and term. It’s something like that, and they talk about you don’t want an entire insurance
portfolio of whole life ’cause it’s super costly, and that’s kind of regular Army. I mean, it’s the platinum policy. You’re paying a lot. You’re getting a high level of coverage. The Reserve components
provide this ability for this balanced
portfolio of capabilities. You will hear a lot about, hey, there’s this Reserve component unit is in the early deployer
stack or force (mumbling), and sometimes that is required. I mean, there are some units which are better suited for Reserve component type function, like civil affairs comes to mind, but that should not be the
normal course of action, so we should have a portfolio where the Reserve components do not have this early requirement because that is just not
a natural state of affairs to be extraordinarily highly ready and to be in the Reserve component. So I think in some cases, I’m speaking out of school because I’m not in the school anymore. We need to kind of even that out and to make sure that we have got the right capabilities
and the right components, and that for the most part, early deploying capabilities are contained in the regular Army except when there’s a unique capability that is best suited to be cited in the Reserve components. – So as long as we’re
talking out of school, I’ll pitch in a little bit too, so I talked in my four
sort of notes at the end about how you have to
include the word time in everything you do when
it comes to readiness, and the Reserve component is one of those classic situations where if I have the
time to get them ready, then they’re actually the force of choice in a lot of cases, as opposed to an active component one. The other thing that I have to have to get them ready is resources, so for example, I mean, we discussed when I was
still on active duty. I don’t know whether they’ve
talked about it lately, but one of the ways you
helped reduce stress on the active component force was by using Guard and Reserve forces for known deployments where otherwise we could
have used an AC unit. One was available. You have to worry because we can only use the Army Reserve and the Army Guard so many times for a variety of reasons, and unless that money was specifically put into the OCO budget, that’s coming out of some
other cost in the Army to pay that 400 days of active duty time for that unit. But if you absolutely have to preserve some AC unit for 24 hour response, and they’re the last
ones you have available to go to a named unit, to go to a named operation, and you’ve got the time required to get that RC unit ready, you can do that. So there’s trades both in peace time, and then in war time, I talked about using the C rating as a start point for discussion, not an end point for discussion. So again if, for example, I know that there’s a
high priority capability in the theater support or theater opening package that’s in their RC, and maybe the training
model from first Army says, “I need 45 days to get it ready,” or 30 days to get it ready, or 15 days to get it ready, and the COCOM really wants it in 10, but I know it’s gonna stay in the port in a secured area and doing just this mission
for the first 30 days, maybe I can take some risk and deploy it at a lower
level of readiness. Maybe I can choose which tasks I actually have to train it on, get it deployed, and then retrain it before I allow it out of that secured area and further on into the movement pipeline, but if you take C rating as a start point for discussion, not an end point of a discussion, you can find those kind of creative uses, whether it’s for an AC unit or for an RC unit. We did some work at RAND that talked a lot about
how do you sequence units through General James’s
mobilization enterprise, and the standard answer is in accordance with the TPFDD. But it turns out that you might actually be more effective if the COCOMs TPFDD has enough flexibility within it to sequence units differently, and you’ll get the right capabilities in the right place with the right training at the right time in a more effective way than just straight TPFDD based management, so some ideas that are out there. They all have strengths. They all have weaknesses, and they all have costs, so you got to balance it. – [John] Afternoon, gentlemen. (mumbling) John Karmire, Chief of Aviation Safety
for the National Guard. I wrote all this down because my head’s spinning ’cause you guys are talking
a lot of cool stuff, and I really appreciate it, but going off the missile
launcher metaphor, sir, being able to count
them is very important. In my mind, in safety, if we can manage risk
at the enterprise level, and if the three and four star level knows that X is a problem, whatever hazard it is, and we do a big buy, we get economies of scale. That’s the first takeaway for me, and an enterprise IT
solution being conducted in real time for USR, imagine if the (mumbling) or whatever level you’re
putting the data in is available to you guys at the top level, you can actually plug in assets. COCOM commanders can do their thing and predict assets needed in real time, and resources can be projected or reallocated in real time based on real need versus, oh, we wish, or if only. That’s all I have. Thanks. – I will say, and this may not be part of your question, but USR analysis is mostly driving by looking in the rear view mirror, and so you’re driving based
on what units reported to you 30 or 60 days ago, and at least when I was on the Army staff, we had no real predictive readiness. So we couldn’t tell you where 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne was gonna be in six months
or something like that ’cause our systems could not look out, and I think as you talked
about enterprise IT, that capability is probably starting to come into grasp of the Army where you can see the personnel status and the equipment status
six, maybe even a year out. I don’t know, and maybe, Charlie, I don’t know if we’ve made any progress– – Yeah, we have. We have some, but we got work to do. I mean, there’s a lot there, (laughing) but it’s a systems architecture data merge that’s got to happen, so we’re not there yet, but secretary talked
about it this morning. I can tell you that we’re working on it. It’s gonna take time, and then more complicated is it’s not necessarily
an apples, compo one, oranges, compo two. I mean, it’s a different look, so we got to be careful. I think the Department of Defense is trying to wrap their arms around it ’cause that predictive tool would be very helpful for commanders, so we’re working it. – Yeah, sort of to follow that up, just from my perspective, if it’s automatic, the data, everybody loves data calls. Hey, we need, we need, we need. We spend more time ginning up slides and presentations as opposed to the boss going in and saying, “This is what I can see, “and if I don’t understand it, “explain it to me,” in real time. Therefore you eliminate
the workflow product, and the end user, you all, at the four star level and the OSD level, can make predictions. – [Chris] Sir, please. – [Charles] First of all, thank
you for the excellent panel, your insider perspective. This Charles (mumbling), CCDC U.S. Army Research Laboratory. The question for you is the United States is the world leader today, and our mission is to keep the world in peace and in order so that the people in the world can advance our civilization
to the next stage, and I wonder how this mission or this ultimate goal, objective can be connected to
the strategic readiness of the U.S. Army, and then how we define our readiness in order to accomplish
our ultimate objective? – I’ll start from the theater perspective. A fundamental aspect of
our mission is deterrence, and deterrence is created by readiness at all three echelons, so I think this is fundamental to keeping a peaceful world. – I guess I touched on it a
little bit in my comments. I think that forces forward in theaters that are out operating, they’re enabling access. Their presence is felt in the region, and that combination provides a degree of influence that absent U.S. leadership and absent sort of international
or coalition unity, there would be challenges greater than I think that we have today. So I think that, again, back to the Defender Series and all the joint
exercises that we support across the globe with
the combatant commanders and the ongoing current operations that have U.S. forces involved enable all of that, and that I think that it matters that the U.S. is there and conducting missions on behalf of not just the countries
that we’re operating with, but our commanders that
are forward in theater. – [Charles] Okay, thank you. Okay, thank you for your answers, and my next question is that I wonder if by reflection on the thinking, always the thinking, about the recent two wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, if we can turn back the clock in terms of Army’s strategic planning, can we get a better outcome compared with the reality, or in another word, can we do better by rethinking or learning about what we have learned? – I’ll take a crack at one aspect, and that is mobilization, and I think we struggled at the start. I want to say 2004, 2005, thinking about power projection platforms, getting Reserve component units through these mobilization sites. I think we, for whatever reason, we had lost those skills, and so we had to kind
of regenerate all those, and it was painful, and so thinking about that, I think in the future, we can do a better job with that by anticipating, tasking. It just seemed like we were learning it from scratch at the time when I was trying to equip that force, and I know others were trying to train it. It just seemed harder than
it needed to be at the time. – [Charles] Okay, and how do we apply the deterrence in that situation? – I think deterrence is a function of your adversary’s perception and how it affects his
decision making process, and that perception is in part a function of the activities that we take, and one of those fundamental activities is to be prepared. – [Charles] Okay, so thank you. – [Man] (mumbling) Seapower Magazine, you’ve talked a lot here, and the secretary this morning. Strategic readiness basically is how that we get the Army to where it needs to be for the fight. A major way you get most
of your heavy forces is sea lift. The MARAD and the
Military Sea Lift Command are in pretty sad shape right now. MARAD’s got some of the oldest ships still sailing the planet, and they just did stress test of them, and they’re still
struggling with the figures about how many ships they
could actually get mobilized ’cause it’s not only the
condition of the ships. It’s the lack of trained mariners, civilian mariners, who are qualified to go on those ships. A major movement of your
forces requires sea lift. My question is, are your exercises going to stress that sea lift capability to see whether the Navy can support you in that
part of the mission? – So I think there’s
some really good studies going on right now that the Department of
Defense are looking into. I think that I would not
underestimate TRANSCOM, so, yes, while there are some challenges with some of those, and I’m a little out
of school on this one, but I just can give you some thoughts on what’s actually underway, but I would not underestimate TRANSCOM, so I think we can move. In fact, I know we can move. Yes, sir. – [Chris] Sir. – Gentlemen, good afternoon. My name is Paul Tennant. I’m the British Military
Attache here in D.C. I’d just like to ask for comment really on a specific element of
the global operating model. As you know, the GOM is broken down into four different layers, the contact, the blunt, the
search, and the homeland. The layer that really interests me in the scope of this panel is the blunt layer, which just by way of
reminder is sub-defined into delay, degrade, or
deny adversary aggression. To me that represents a new, or if not totally new, mostly new challenge
to readiness planning, and I’d be really interested in how you anticipate addressing the readiness challenge within that layer. – Could you say your name again, please? No, I’m just teasing, Paul. Nice to see you. Nobody recognizes Paul (mumbling). Yeah, so, Paul, that’s
exactly the question about where things are positioned and what state of readiness they’re in, so depending on which
theater you’re talking about, in my personal case, the European theater, it depends which things are prepositioned, which things are assigned and present, and which things can move how fast from a standing start level of readiness, so it touches everything that both Tom and Mike talked about
in terms of calibrating, how much readiness does a force need? We’ve worked those, the
math on those, very hard for the European theater, and it’s the sweet spot that
we’re trying to achieve. Obviously exactly where
we see that sweet spot isn’t something we’d discuss
in a large forum like this, but that sweet spot is exactly
what we need to achieve. In the case of the European theater, it’s critical to understand that the best way to close
the time, distance gaps is to do things as an alliance or as a large, multi-lateral force, pre-Article Five if necessary, so we return again to strategic, tactical, and operational
interoperability. Our ability to be ready to work together as one of the fundamental
conditions of readiness at each of those echelons is fundamental to our
ability to have a blunt layer that can achieve the
objectives of the blunt layer. – [Man] My name is (speaking
in a foreign language). I’m the Spanish Military
Attache here in D.C., and I’ll continue with the last question and with your comment,
sir, with your answer, interoperability is one
of these key elements, specifically working in a coalition, and particularly when the coalition is a coalition of the
willing led by the U.S. Sometimes no matter how
much interoperable we are in terms of systems or units, sometimes the flow of information because of the strict regulations, because of the security classification, is really hampering even the mission. Sometimes it’s really
hard to get information, the necessary information, in time, so taking this into account with the new idea of this
Cloud (mumbling) enterprise that will require the
tremendous flow of information, do you think it is
necessary to work on this to try to solve this flow of information regarding partners and allies? Is there any initiative on that regard? Thank you, sir. – Yeah, absolutely, so first of all, I favor the discussion of interoperability that we find in the AJP
on interoperability, the Ally Joint Publication, which says that interoperability is a function of three factors, human interoperability,
procedural operability, and technical interoperability, and we can develop each of
these simultaneously or alone. Each of them requires different types of activity to develop. By far the most challenging thing is to develop pure
technical interoperability at tactical echelons because this requires a proliferation of interoperable systems across the force. Procedural things and human things, that’s easy to get after. General (speaking in a foreign
language) and I recently had a long discussion about the frequency of the U.S. interaction
with the Spanish Army, and I think we have a way to go ahead. With regard to the technical things, we have been spending
a great deal of effort to create a mission partner environment much like the Afghan Mission
Network, except standing. It began with an idea inside the U.S. forces in Europe, but it’s spread to the Pacific and across the Army now, and there’s a U.S. Army program to have an interoperable, multinational, operational network, and the intention would be to conduct the vast majority of our operations and exercise information on that network. In the U.S. Army in Europe, we are migrating onto that right now so that we can be in a position to have constant
communication with our allies. I do point out that each of those allies will have to take policy decisions and to make some acquisition decisions in order to be able to
participate in that network. I would say the first thing is really having a space,
an electronic space, in which we are all comfortable operating and passing information, but your simple question was, do I think that’s important? Absolutely. – [Man] Thank you, sir– – I would say Defender ’22 is sort of the first at scale deployment of the MP environment that we’ve done. As Chris pointed out, we’ve been spending a fair amount of resources over time on it, and we’re prepared to make some decisions here in the near term, given what we are seeing and what commanders are telling us, but I echo the human and the
procedural part of it too, and recognize that not necessarily all the technical ones are gonna be integrated
where everybody’s happy, but we’ve got to find some level of, some degree of, comfort
with those systems first to be able to operate together. – [Man] Thank you, sir. – Let me just add. I think the Army has learned this lesson, and they are, in their
new network programs, like integrated tactical networks, starting to keep that as a requirement that it have some
interoperable capabilities versus requiring an in-theater
engineering solution, and so it seems like we
forget that every time, and then we have to put together something like an Afghan Mission Network on (mumbling) or something like that. At least at this point, until money becomes a problem, those programs are
keeping interoperability as a requirement at this point, so maybe there’s some hope in the future. – All right, anybody else, any other questions? All right, gents, thank you so much. This was a fantastic panel. (mumbling) (audience applauding) Gonna turn it over to
Honorable Murphy real quick. (mumbling) – Mike, good to see you again.

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